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ABSTRACT
With the emergence of connected objects and the development
of Artiicial Intelligence (AI) mechanisms and algorithms, person-
alized applications are gaining an expanding interest, providing
services tailored to each single user needs and expectations. They
mainly rely on the massive collection of personal data generated
by a large number of applications hosted from diferent connected
devices. In this paper, we present CoWSA, a privacy preserving
Cooperative computation framework for personalized Web Search
peripheral Applications. The proposed framework is multi-fold.
First, it provides the empowerment to end-users to control the dis-
closed personal data to third parties, while leveraging the trade-of
between privacy and utility. Second, as a decentralized solution,
CoWSAmitigates single points of failures, while ensuring the secu-
rity of queries, the anonymity of submitting users, and the incentive
of contributing nodes. Third, CoWSA is scalable as it provides ac-
ceptable computation and communication costs compared to most
closely related schemes.
CCS CONCEPTS
· Security and privacy→ Security services; Privacy-preserving
protocols; · Computer systems organization→ Peer-to-peer ar-
chitectures;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web Search Engines (WSEs) enable internet users to retrieve useful
information based on submitted queries and a set of related data
contents. In fact, most of existing WSEs record several information,
based on submitted queries, known as query logs. Generally, these
logs include the query's keywords, IP address, browser type and
language, query's context information, i.e.; date, time and location
of the request, as well as other identifying information such as
a reference to cookies included in the user's browser. Relying on
these collected information, WSEs are then able to deduce corre-
lations and interest patterns, while relying on speciic dedicated
algorithms [18]. Indeed, users' proiles are created and regularly
updated, in order to classify users based on their interests.
User proiles present a valuable information for WSEs. First, they
permit to improve the results for users' queries. For instance, in
[14], Agosti et al. stated that users generally provide short queries,
meaning that the data query does not contain a suicient number
of useful terms⁄words that permit to discard irrelevant contents.
Consequently, WSEs mainly rely on users’ proiles to enrich short
queries and discard irrelevant results to the requesting user. For
instance, let us consider the word apple. This term can refer to
the fruit or to the high-tech company. Thus, based on the user
proile, WSE is able to infer the correct sense of the word used by
the querying entity. In [5], Cooper detailed several applications
of users' proiles permitting to improve the user experience while
receiving personalized results. For example, based on the submitted
query coupled with the user's proile, several personalized and rel-
evant advertisements and⁄or news are shown up. It is worth noting
that these systems have become extremely eicient engines for
online activities. In [14], Mackenzie et al. claimed that 35 % of what
consumers buy on Amazon and 75 % of what they watch on Netlix
is attributable to personalized recommendations.
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These recommendations and personalized relevant results are
usually the result of a massive collection of users' personal data.
In fact, in several cases, queries may contain identifying informa-
tion that permits to precisely identify the user, e.g., name, geo-
localization, name and address of the employer, etc. Other queries
may contain sensitive information revealing the religion, health
status, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, · · · that are generally con-
sidered as highly sensitive to owners.
Contributions Ð In this paper, we propose to set up a multi-hop
computationmethod between a client and the service provider, in or-
der to ensure users' privacy against both curious service providers
and malicious entities. In fact, we introduce CoWSA, a cooper-
ative computation framework that combines two main privacy-
enhancing techniques, namely data perturbation and collabora-
tive secure computation. The proposed framework has several ad-
vantages. First, it enables end-users to manage and minimize the
amount of disclosed personal data to third parties. In fact, users'
proiles are stored locally at the user side and are never shared with
service providers. Indeed, only some relevant users' attributes are
disclosed to service providers, w.r.t. each submitted single query.
Second, CoWSA relies on a decentralized architecture. It allows
end-users to securely submit their queries, while relying on ran-
dom intermediate nodes. These entities are encouraged to join a
particular query w.r.t. their relevant interests, and to add their in-
terests to the query's associated proile, as they receive in return
a panorama of personalized ads and news, w.r.t. the aggregated
proile of interest to them. This mitigates single points of failures,
while ensuring the anonymity of the quering users. Third, CoWSA
is scalable as it provides acceptable computation and communica-
tion costs compared to most closely related schemes.
Paper organization — Section 2 details the functional and secu-
rity requirements and Section 3 presents the related work. Section
4 gives an overview of CoWSA and details the main procedures
and algorithms. Section 5 provides a detailed security analysis and
Section 6 discusses implementation results, before concluding in
Section 7.
2 DESIGN GOALS
The design of CoWSA is motivated by ensuring a good trade-of
between the privacy (deined in section 2.2 as covering itself three re-
quirements) and data utility, i.e. the capacity of the service providers
(WSEs, third parties) to give satisfaction to users with personalized
search answers, ads and news - adapted to the user's interests. This
leads to identifying the following functional and security properties.
2.1 Functional Properties
To ensure a good trade-of between the privacy and data utility,
two main functional properties are considered:
• accurate group proile: the proposed protocol should line-
up users w.r.t. their interests, i.e., users are grouped according
to similar proiles. The accurate grouping permits WSE to
improve clients' and users' experience and provides person-
alized results. Note that several works propose grouping
users, relying on social networks. However, these assump-
tions may be strong in the sense that users do not necessarily
have a social network.
• lexibility: as a Peer to Peer (P2P) [9] based solution, it
is important to ensure an eicient users' management (i.e.,
joining and leaving a group). Thus, lexibility also requires a
continuous presence of a certain number of on-line devices,
such that a set of devices have to be connected to the Internet
to ensure relaying other users' queries.
2.2 Security and Privacy Requirements
In order to appropriately deine security and privacy requirements,
we consider three main adversaries, as follows:
• curiousweb search engine: tries to identify the requesting
user, in order to build a precise proile.
• malicious user: attempts to learn the queries of the initially
requesting client, or, as an insider attacker, attempts to inject
false inputs to the aggregate proile.
• malicious client: attempts to learn the proile of the inter-
mediate users.
• selish user: tries to get beneit from the protocol without
participating. Indeed, a selish user uses the network to only
submit his own queries, i.e., without collaborating to forward
other users' queries. Note that such nodes' behavior may
cause a denial of service.
Both curious WSE and malicious users are mainly considered
against privacy and data leakage, while the selish user adversary
is considered against performance concerns. The proposed CoWSA
protocol has to ensure the following security and privacy require-
ments:
• anonymity: ensures that neither the requesting user, nor
intermediate relaying nodes should be identiied by the WSE
and⁄or malicious users.
• queries’ conidentiality: queries' contents have to remain
secret to intermediate relaying nodes.
• unlinkability: ensures that neither a curiousWSE nor a ma-
licious outsider is able to link a query to its related⁄corresponding
user.
2.3 Performance Requirements
Two main requirements are deined to ensure a good quality of
service for CoWSA users:
• scalability: the proposed protocol should provide accept-
able communication overheads, hence, maintaining an ac-
ceptable response time, even with a high number of partici-
pating entities.
• no single point of failurewhen initializing users’ groups:
as a P2P solution, CoWSA manages users' groups with no
need for a central node.
• single point of failure mitigation when accessing to
WSE: in case of selish users, the client needs to select an-
other group of users for getting the WSE service.
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3 RELATEDWORK
Several works have been proposed, in the literature, to preserve pri-
vacy andminimize the amount of data collected by service providers
while providing services tailored to user proiles [3, 4, 11, 13, 19, 20],
[16] and [17].
In [3], Castella et al. introduced a multi-party protocol, called
Useless User Protocol (UUP), based on dynamic groups. The main
idea behind this scheme is that a central node creates a group of
users after receiving n queries. Afterwards, users can securely ex-
change their queries, while submitting queries on behalf of each
other. As a result, the web search engine cannot create a proile of
a particular user. To enhance conidentiality, several measures are
performed on queries before their distribution, namely encryptions,
re-maskings and permutations. The response is then distributed
to all group members. Each user selects only his response and
eliminates other search results. Even though the [3] proposal sup-
ports several security properties, it is not resistant against selish
users and malicious clients. Later, in [20], Shou et al. introduced
a client-side privacy-protection system for personalized service.
The proposed construction captures users' proiles in a hierarchi-
cal taxonomy, w.r.t. several privacy-level assurance. However, the
proposed system cannot resist to malicious users, with broader
knowledge, such as richer relationship among queries' domains,
e.g., exclusiveness, sequentiality, etc.
In [19], Romero et al. presented a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) system to en-
sure privacy-preserving web search services. The proposed scheme
classiies users into groups according to their interests, in order
to create a group proile. The classiication of users into groups is
performed by a set of nodes, called super-peers, that mainly refer
to distributed brokers. Thus, the proposed system does not support
the privacy property of end-users against curious super-peers, as
they are able to create users' proiles and collude with both WSEs
and third parties, i.e., advertisements and news servers.
In [4], the authors proposed a privacy-preserving web search sys-
tem, called blind web-search, based on a Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE) [10] scheme and Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
[12, 22]. The [4] proposed a single keyword queries with exact
matches, and a generic construction for multiple-keyword searches
[21]. However, based on advanced cryptographic techniques, the
proposed framework generates high computation and communica-
tion overheads.
Recently, Lai et al. proposed a decentralized search system, called
QueenBee [13]. The proposed framework deines a new search en-
gine businessmodel by ofering incentives to both content providers
and peers that participate in QueenBee's page indexing and ranking
operations. Even the proposed framework is promising, it requires
building a new infrastructure, thus generating high processing
overheads and induces inter-operability concerns w.r.t. existing
infrastructures.
In [17], Pires et al. present a decentralized Private Web search
solution, called CYCLOSA. The proposed solution involves an SGX-
based 1 browser extension in the web browsers. The main idea
behind CYCLOSA is to send fake queries to the WSE taking into
account the sensitivity of the user query. Indeed, the CYCLOSA
browser extension irstly calculates a score k w.r.t. the sensibility of
1https:⁄⁄software.intel.com⁄en-us⁄sgx
Figure 1: Network Model
the user query. Then, it selects k +1 random peers to which it sends
k fake queries and the real one. Afterwards, the peer receiving the
query, stores it in a local table of past queries and, as a proxy, for-
wards it directly to the WSE. The latter sends back the search result
to the last node which forwards the answer to the initial sender.
Finally, CYCLOSA retrieves the response corresponding to the real
query and displays it to the user. Although the CYCLOSA solution
deals with several security challenges, namely unlinkability and
indistinguishability, it does not ensure the sender's anonymity w.r.t.
relay nodes as they know the real source of the query. Furthermore,
the CYCLOSA solution degrades the level of personalization of the
search results as the WSE response matches the relay node pro-
ile and not the query sender's one. Moreover, in CYCLOSA the
k + 1 established connections for each user query generate more
communication overhead and bandwidth consumption.
4 COWSA DESCRIPTION
In this section, we irst present the network model in subsection
4.1. Then, we give an overview of diferent phases and algorithms
in subsection 4.2.
4.1 Network Model
For our network model, we assume that each client obtains a char-
acterizing proile, encompassing several categories. On the other
hand, we assume the service provider is a search engine, interacting
with an advertising and news agency. Note that ads and news are
also categorized and annotated with keywords.
As depicted in Figure 1, CoWSA involves ive diferent entities,
deined as follows:
• Client (C): submits queries to the web search engine, and
protects his own privacy from malicious relay nodes and
curious service providers.
• Users (U): are intermediate nodes that relay clients' queries,
while enclosing their sub-proiles, that are relevant to the
client's submitted query.
• Web Search Engine server (WSE): is responsible for pro-
viding most relevant responses to clients' queries, w.r.t. the
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aggregated proile. It also serves as a proxy between users
and third parties.
• Third Parties (TPs): represent the advertising and news
providers. TPs provide ads and news, w.r.t. the aggregated
proile transferred by the WSE. Their main objective is to
better adapt the recommendations to received proiles.
• Trusted Authority (TA): is a trusted entity that is respon-
sible for the system initialization: i.e., key generation algo-
rithms. Note that TA is not involved in queries' processing
procedures.
We assume that users are organized into clusters. The orga-
nization of users into clusters is out of the scope of this paper.
Meanwhile, to it the totally decentralized architecture, we propose
to build groups of users, within Publish and Subscribe networks
(Pub⁄Sub) [8, 15]. The Pub⁄Sub paradigm is a well-known approach
for disseminating information between multiple interested entities
in a decoupled and asynchronous manner. Message producers sub-
mit messages to a broker network which routes those to interested
subscribers. In our setting, we suppose that subscribers are users
that express their interest in speciic queries' domains⁄categories
by issuing subscriptions. Thus, CoWSA mainly relies on the use of
multi-broker Pub-Sub networks [6, 7].
4.2 Overview
CoWSA is set upon a decentralized architecture. It extends proxy-
based WSE solutions to provide privacy preserving decentralized
WSE framework. CoWSA relies on three main procedures: Sys_Init,
Query_Submit and Query_Resp.
The Sys_Init phase occurs once to setup the system. It involves
the creation of the diferent groups of users, with respect to their
shared interests.
TheQuery_Submit corresponds to the process of submitting a query
to theWSE server. Indeed, when a client wants to issue a data query
to the WSE, he attaches a sub-proile, i.e., the category of his proile
that corresponds to the domain of the request. Instead of directly
sending the data query to the WSE server, the client chooses a
random path, i.e., a set of users expected to relay the data query. At
each hop, the intermediate user has to increase the proile of the
user by his own sub-proile, including the category of his proile
that corresponds to the domain of the request.
The Query_Resp phase occurs when the WSE receives the request
and the aggregated proile. This latter transfers the proile to the
TPs, i.e., the advertising and news agencies. The results are then
transmitted via the same path. Thus, each intermediate user receives
the news corresponding to his sub-proile, while deciphering only
the matching information associated with his sub-proile. The end
user, meanwhile, receives the result of his data query by displaying
some recommended advertisements.
For ease of presentation, the diferent notations used in this
paper are listed in Table 1.
4.3 CoWSA Phases
In this section, we detail the main three CoWSA phases.
4.3.1 Sys_Init Procedure. The Sys_Init procedure initializes the
whole system, relying on two main algorithms, referred to as:
set↓prf and key↓gen.
Table 1: Notations used in this paper
Notation Description
C Client
U User
WSE Web Search Engine server
TPs Third Parties
PU Users' proiles
C A category belonging to a user proile PU
I An interest belonging to category C
λ A security parameter
sk A private key
pk A public key
q The query content
pth The query path
Q The query vector
A A random subset of interested usersU
enc An encryption algorithm - encsC−WSE (m) for symmetric encryption ofm with sC−WSE
and enc(pk,m) for asymmetric encryption ofm with public key pk
dec A decryption algorithm with similar notations as enc
sC−WSE A session key between a client C and a Web Search Engine serverWSE
M A routing pair composed of the predecessor and next relay users
qe The encrypted query
PQ,aдд The aggregated proile associated to the query qe
S A search result
RA,PQ,aдд The ads' result associated to the aggregated proile PQ,aдд
RN,PQ,aдд The news' result associated to the aggregated proile PQ,aдд
RQ,PQ,aдд The encrypted search result associated to the query q
R The query responses' vector
The set↓prf consists on building users' proiles PU . Note that
several proiles can be assigned to each user. Each proile PU is
deined as a set of categories Ci (i.e., i ∈ {1, · · · , l} and l is the
maximum number of supported categories). Each category consists
on a set of interests Ij (i.e., j ∈ {1, · · · ,m} andm is the maximum
number of supported interests), deined as follows:
PU = {Ci }i ∈{1, · · · ,l } = {Ii , j }i ∈{1, · · · ,l }, j ∈{1, · · · ,m }
As stated above, clients' and end-users' proiles are out-of-scope of
this paper. Indeed, CoWSA is built onMasq [1], a client-centric pro-
iling tool, introduced in 2019, by Qwant [2], a privacy-preserving
WSE. Note that clients and users' proiles can be updated, with
respect to each entity's interests and interaction with diferent
applications.
The key↓gen algorithm is executed by a trusted authority. It
takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of a
public and private keys for each system's entity, namely clients,
users andWSE server, deined as: (ski ,pki ), where i ∈ {U ,C,WSE}.
4.3.2 uery_Submit Procedure. The Query_Submit procedure in-
cludes three main algorithms, namely: set↓path, set↓query and
relay↓query.
When a client (C) wants to submit a query to WSE, he irst
deines the query vector Q, deined as follows:
Q = [pth, {Ii , j },q]
where pth represents the query path, {Ii , j } and q is the query
content.
The client irst runs the set↓path algorithm. For this purpose,
(C) points out a set of categories {Ci } that are relevant to the content
of the query to be submitted to WSE. Based on his selected inter-
ests w.r.t. deined query's categories, the client (C) publishes these
categories, relying on the Pub⁄Sub infrastructure. Thus, brokers
perform the matching between query's categories and potential
active users' interests [15]. (C) is then notiied, by brokers, with
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interested active users that may relay his query. Afterwards, (C)
selects a set of potential relay users, and sets up the query path
as a set of encapsulated identities and public keys, as shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 set↓path algorithm
1: Input: the set of interested active users {(Ui ,pkUi )}
2: Output: the encapsulated query path pth
3: pth← (UC ,pkC );
4: pick random a subset of potential interested users to set up the
query path A ⊆ {(Ui ,pkUi )};
5: for all i ∈ {1, · · · , |A|} do
6: pth ← (Ui , enc(pkUi , pth)), where enc is an asymmetric
encryption algorithm;
7: end for
8: return pth
The deined pth represents the encapsulation of the public keys
of diferent active users, that have been selected by the client to
relay his query. Note that set↓path algorithm is optional and (C)
might choose no-relay users for his query, thus leading to pth =
(UC ,pkC ).
Once the pth is set, the client performs the set↓query algorithm.
To do so, (C) irst generates a session key, denoted by sC−WSE .
Then, he encrypts the query content q and the session key using
the public key of WSE such that qe = enc(pkWSE , {q, sC−WSE })
and the query vector is hence updated and deined as:
Q = [pth, {Ii , j },qe ]
Note that the use of a session key, shared by only the submitting
client and the WSE, enables to keep secret the query' results from
relaying nodes. That is, only (C) is able to decrypt the result of the
query, received from the WSE.
Once the query vectorQ is set, the client executes the relay↓query
algorithm prior to sending Q to the irst relay user, which repeats
the same actions - relay↓query and forwarding - upto the last
user on the path. As shown in Algorithm 2, each intermediate
node relays the query while adding his interests and updating the
aggregated proile, w.r.t. his expected rewarding ads and news.
In order to fulill the personalization requirements and to lever-
age the trade-of between privacy and utility, CoWSA relies on
the aggregated proile, built w.r.t. cooperative hop-by-hop process
between diferent interested users. As mentioned above, contrary
to existing collaborative solutions, CoWSA deines a rewarding
function, such that the relay users receive personalized ads and
news, w.r.t. aggregated proile. Thus, these users are encouraged to
join a particular query w.r.t. their relevant interests, and to add their
interests to the query's associated proile, as they receive in return
a panorama of personalized ads and news, w.r.t. the aggregated
proile, that interest them.
For ease of presentation, we deine the aggregated proile as a
clear content. However, to better ensure the security of the sub-
mitted query and the privacy of involved parties, CoWSA enables
clients and users to share a session group key дk , such that the
query's relevant interests {Ii , j } are encrypted and updated relying
Algorithm 2 relay↓query algorithm, executed by UserUk
1: Input: the query Q, the pair of public and private keys ofUk
(skUk ,pkUk )
2: Output: routing pairMk = (prd,nxt), updated query Q
3: set prd = pkUk−1 ; k − 1 represents the index of the predecessor
relay user;
4: updateMk ;
5: for Ci = {I1, · · · ,Ij } do
6: if Ci ∈ PUk then
7: Ci ← Ci ∪ Ij+1; Ij+1 ∈ PUk
8: update Q;
9: end if
10: end for
11: pth← dec(skUk , pth);
12: pick nxt from pth and update (Mk ,Q);
13: return (Mk ,Q)
on дk and a symmetric encryption algorithm. We assume that both
client and users securely store the group key дk .
Arriving at the last relay user, the query vector is complete.
At this point, the initial query is considered accompanied by an
aggregated proile. The query is then sent to WSE, to perform the
Query_Resp procedure, detailed hereafter.
4.3.3 uery_Resp Procedure. The Query_Resp procedure involves
three diferent algorithms, namely: proc↓query, relay↓rsp and
get↓rsp.
The proc↓query algorithm is executed by WSE server, upon
receiving the query Q from the last relaying userUn , deined as:
Q = [pth,PQ,aдд,qe ]
where pth = (Un,pkUn ), PQ,aдд is the aggregated proile asso-
ciated to the query, and qe is the encrypted query content along
with the session key (generated by the submitting client). The
proc↓query algorithm consists in three sub-tasks, deined as fol-
lows:
• First, the WSE server extracts the query content q from qe .
For this purpose, he irst decrypts qe using his private key
skWSE to retrieve the shared session key sC−WSE and query
contentq. Then, theWSE selects and ranks the search results,
denoted by S, that are associated to PQ,aдд . Afterwards, he
encrypts S, as follows:
RQ,PQ,aдд = encsC−WSE (S)
• Second, the WSE server shares the aggregated proile with
TPs, namely advertisement and news servers. Each TP then
provides a set of ranked results, associated to the PQ,aдд ,
referred to as RA,PQ,aдд and RN,PQ,aдд , for ads and news
respectively.
• Third, upon receiving TPs' responses, theWSE server creates
the query responses' vector R, deined as follows:
R = [RQ,PQ,aдд ,RA,PQ,aдд ,RN,PQ,aдд ]
As introduced above, the WSE creates R and returns it in the op-
posite direction, i.e., following the opposite sense of the query path,
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i.e., A = {Un, · · · ,U1,C}. Thus, WSE starts the relay˙rsp algo-
rithm and sends R to the userUn , that submitted the Q. Each relay
userUi , then, performs the relay↓rsp algorithm, while retrieving
results from TPs, namely RA,PQ,aдд and RN,PQ,aдд , w.r.t. the ag-
gregated proile. Then, based on the routing pairMi = (prd,next),
Ui picks prd = pkUi+1 and sends Q to the next hop, until reaching
the client (C).
When the client receives the query response, he performs the
get↓rsp algorithm. Indeed, he retrieves personalized resultsRA,PQ,aдд
and RN,PQ,aдд , associated to PQ,aдд and executes get↓rsp as de-
tailed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 get↓rsp algorithm
1: Input: the query response R, the session key sC−WSE
2: Output: search results S
3: extract RQ,PQ,aдд from R;
4: S ← decsC−WSE (RQ,PQ,aдд );
5: return S
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the resistance of the proposed CoWSA
framework against curious service providers and malicious entities,
introduced in section 2.
5.1 Against Curious WSE
Curious WSE servers aim at precisely identifying the submitting
client, in order to build a ine-grained proile, and provide personal-
ized results. This attack is considered against the privacy property,
which involves the anonymity and unlinkability requirements.
As CoWSA framework relies on a fully decentralized architecture,
users and clients are connected to each other, such that they share
the same interests, based on Pub⁄Sub networks. Thus, two main
consequences are identiied:
• As each client submits his queries on behalf of other users,
by executing relay↓query, the WSE server cannot distin-
guish which query belongs to each user⁄client. Thus, the
unlinkability property is preserved.
• Let us assume the worst case, where a client (C) chooses
not to run the relay↓query algorithm, as it is considered as
optional. (C) submits his queries directly to the WSE server,
during two diferent sessions α and β , such that:
Q(α ) = [(UC ,pkC ),P
(α )
Q,aдд,qe
(α )]
Q(β ) = [(UC ,pkC ),P
(β )
Q,aдд,qe
(β )]
Based on diferent queries, received from the same client
(i.e., pkC ), the WSE server cannot precisely conirm if the
query comes from the submitting client or a relaying user.
So that, the anonymity requirement is ensured.
5.2 Against Malicious Users
Malicious users aim at learning the queries that are submitted by
the client or identifying the originating client.
On one hand, the main information that a malicious user Ui
can possess, is the routing pairMi = (prd,nxt). The routing pair
corresponds to the previous relaying user (prd) and the next one
(nxt). Knowing this information, a malicious user cannot discern if
the query was generated by the relaying predecessor or if that user
was relying it on behalf of another client. In addition, the malicious
user cannot deduce the topology of a cluster, i.e., users that are
interested to relay a client's query, nor the number of relaying
users from the client to the WSE server. Furthermore, the system is
dynamic and relies on a Pub⁄Sub network, where users are able to
join a query based on shared interests. This prevents a malicious
user from inding the real source of a query.
On the other hand, queries' contents are concatenated with a
session key, randomly generated by the client. The result is then en-
crypted using the public key ofWSE server. This prevents malicious
users to learn the content of the query as well as the associated
results, since search results are enciphered using the generated
session key.
5.3 Against Malicious Clients
The main goal of malicious clients consists in learning the proile
of relaying users. However, once the query vector Q is set, the
submitting client cannot learn users' interests, nor the updated
aggregated proile sent to the WSE server.
On the other hand, the client may learn some generic interests about
a relaying user, when setting the query path A, based on brokers'
notiications. However, this also does not constitute a relevant
amount of information that permits to build a precise proile of
other users, since users express interest in relaying queries, w.r.t.
generic categories.
5.4 Against Selish Users
Selish users try to get beneit from the protocol without collabo-
rating with other users, for instance by submitting only their own
queries. In order to mitigate against selish users, CoWSA proposes
to reward each relaying user, as he receives personalized ads and
news from TPs, w.r.t. a closely related proile. Even though selish
users are still able to use the anonymity mask beneit to submit their
own queries, the presence of such users will not cause any denial
of service, since CoWSA is built upon a decentralized architecture
and users join a query w.r.t. shared interests.
6 PERFORMANCES ANALYSIS
Table 2 presents the processing costs, supported by each involved
entity, w.r.t. diferentCoWSA algorithms. It is worth stating that the
computation cost depends on the selected encryption algorithms,
which is strongly related to the security level. This latter is deter-
mined via the brute-force attack which consists in checking all
possible keys until the correct one is found (i.e; with a key of length
k bits, there are 2k possible keys). Thus, k denotes the security level
in symmetric cryptography. In public-key cryptography, the secu-
rity level of an algorithm is deined with respect to the hardness of
solving a mathematical problem such as the Integer Factorization
for the RSA scheme, implemented by the CoWSA prototype and
detailed hereafter.
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Table 2: Processing Costs of CoWSA algorithms
CoWSA phases Sys_Init Query_Submit Query_Response
CoWSA Algorithms set↓prf key↓gen set↓path set↓query relay↓query proc↓query relay↓rsp get↓rsp
TA ś UγK ś ś ś ś ś ś
C × ś × γk + (n + 1)γEa γP ś ś γDs
WSE ś ś ś ś ś γP + γDa + γS + γEs γP ś
U × ś × ś γDa + γP ś γP ś
TP ś ś ś ś ś γS ś ś
Note: ś indicates that this entity is not involved in processing the associated algorithm; × indicates that the processing cost is not evaluated ;
U represents the number of all the system's entities; n is the number of relaying users; γEs and γDs represent the computation cost of the
encryption and decryption operations of a symmetric encryption scheme, respectively; γEa and γDa represent the computation cost of the
encryption and decryption operations of an asymmetric encryption scheme, respectively; γK and γk represent the cost of key generation
w.r.t. a symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption schemes, respectively; γS is the cost of search results with respect to a user's
proile; γP is the cost of processing the query or response vector, by appending interests or extracting users' identities.
From Table 2, we deduce that the enforcement of a collaborative
search approach does not impact the WSE's processing overhead.
Instead, it requires extra-computation costs from the submitting
client, and involved relaying users. This trade-of between perfor-
mances and privacy is settled by ensuring a better personalization of
services. In fact, contrary to most-closely related solutions, CoWSA
rewards involved users, as they receive personalized ads⁄news,
while relaying a particular query. It also provides better results'
accuracy associated to the aggregated proile, by enforcing the
engagement of diferent interested users.
In this section, we discuss the implementation results of the
proposed CoWSA framework. For this purpose, we implemented
diferent algorithms and procedures and built the CoWSA test-bed,
to show the feasibility of our proposition, in real-world settings.
The CoWSA test-bed is built upon Ubuntu 16.04 machine - with
2 CPUs, 4GB memory and 10GB hard disk - hosting 6 Docker 2
containers, referring to a client (C), four users (U) and a server
(WSE), communicating through network sockets. Based on Python
version 2.7, and the associated cryptographic library Pycrypto 3,
we implemented three python scripts, namely client.py, user.py and
server.py - one for each main actor of our model. Note that, for ease
of presentation, we consider that each search request involves a
single client and three intermediate users.
In the following, we detail the developed algorithms and proce-
dures, w.r.t. Sys_Init, Query_Submit and Query_Resp in subsection
6.1, subsection 6.2 and subsection 6.3 respectively. Then, we provide
a detailed discussion for the implementation results.
6.1 Sys_Init Implementation
The Sys_Init phase consists on the system initialization. As detailed
in Section 4.3, this phase includes the users' proiles creation and
key generation procedures. As CoWSA is built on Masq [1], we set
and implemented the key↓gen algorithm, such that each client (C)
and relaying user (U) possesses the following elements:
2https:⁄⁄www.docker.com
3https:⁄⁄pypi.org⁄project⁄pycrypto⁄
• a pair of a public and private keys (ski ,pki ), where i ∈
{U ,C}, generated using the key↓gen algorithm of the asym-
metric RSA scheme. Note that the public keys, used inCoWSA
test-bed, are 1024-bits length.
• a client⁄user proile extracted from Masq, that deines a set
of categories and sub-categories, i.e., interests. Table 3 rep-
resents an example of proiles of client and users sharing
similar interests.
• access to a shared directory that associates the system's
entities IP addresses to their public keys. This allows (C) to
map each interested user to his public key and identify the
WSE server's public key, in order to set the path pth and
submit the query Q to the corresponding server.
Table 3: Example of a Client and Users’ Proiles considered
as Close
Client cinema (comedy, drama), sport (football, swimming), music (classical, pop)
User 1 cinema (horror, comedy, drama), literature (poetry, novel, theater), music (classical, jazz, pop)
User 2 literature (novel, theater), sport (basketball, hokey), music (rap, reggae, rock)
User 3 cinema (drama, science iction,), sport (football, basketball, swimming), music (electro, pop)
6.2 Query_Submit Implementation
The Query_Submit phase relies on three main algorithms, namely
set↓path, set↓query and relay↓query, and several sub-tasks, de-
tailed here-after. Recall that, for our CoWSA prototype, we suppose
that the query path pth is already set, and it encompasses 3 dif-
ferent users. Thus, we implemented several functions, w.r.t. the
set↓query and relay↓query algorithms, deined as follows:
6.2.1 Initializing the uery Session. In a classical web-search sce-
nario, the query session is initialized by triggering the search engine
from aweb browser. For theCoWSA prototype, a session is initiated
by executing the client.py script. Once the query session is initial-
ized, the query's path pth is deined as a list of three IP addresses
of the selected relaying users, w.r.t. the client.py script.
6.2.2 Defining the uery Vector. The query's vector deinition in-
volves several functions and sub-tasks. First, the client executes
AES.key↓gen algorithm, to derive a 128 − bit session key, denoted
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by sC−WSE . In order to support the encryption of the query's con-
tent and the derived session key, we rely on three functions: (i)
PadMessage and WrapMessage permit to add the padding and
enable the concatenation of several sub-keywords⁄results, respec-
tively; and (ii) PackHostPort converts the IP address and port for-
mats to 32 − bit binary format, thus enabling a multi-layer encryp-
tion of the query path. Note that for the CoWSA prototype, we rely
on the onion routing concept, while executing the AddAllLayers
function.
Second, the client creates the aggregated proile sub-vector, as a
set of associated categories and interests that will be then updated
by the relaying intermediate users. In addition, in order to mitigate
against malicious and curious external adversaries, the CoWSA
prototype involves the encryption of the aggregated proile sub-
vector, using a group key denoted by дk . The group key is shared
between the relaying users. For this purpose, the AES.key↓gen algo-
rithm is executed and a 128 − bit group key is generated. Then, the
aggregated proile sub-vector is randomly illed, w.r.t. the client's
categories. To serialize the query vector for further encryption, we
rely on the dumps function, imported from pickle library.
Finally, in order to diferentiate the client's query from the search
engine's response for the same search session, we added a lag. It
takes f for forward or b for backward to identify the type of the
transmitted vector.
6.2.3 Relaying the uery Vector. To submit the generated query
vector, the client opens a socket with the next relaying user using
the IP address and the port number belonging to the irst item,
as deined in pth. Once the connection is established, the query
vector is sent to the next hop, U . An active user U , i.e., waiting for
incoming connections, receives the query vector, the IP address
and the port of the submitting user⁄client. Based on these pieces
of information, the user.py script is executed to both retrieve the
corresponding public key from the shared directory and extract the
diferent parts of the encrypted query vector. Once the diferent
elements are extracted, the user.py script runs three main functions:
(i) UnWrapMessage and UnPadMessage are executed to return
the session group key and the decrypted content, and remove the
padding characters respectively; and (ii) UnPackHostPort outputs
the IP address and port of the next relaying user. Afterwards, the
user.py script executes the AES.decrypt algorithm, to decipher the
categories' vector using the group key, and the AES module im-
ported from the Crypt.cipher library. Note that the de-serialization
of the vector is performed by the loads function, imported from
pickle library, and the update of the aggregated proile sub-vector
is provided by a random illing of a sub-set of categories.
6.3 Query_Resp Implementation
The third procedure of CoWSA prototype consists on process-
ing the query and relaying the response vector to the submitting
client. It involves three algorithms, i.e., proc↓query, relay↓rsp
and get↓rsp, detailed hereafter.
6.3.1 Processing the uery. The irst algorithm of Query_Resp, i.e.,
proc↓query is executed by server.py upon the reception of Q from
the query's ultimate relaying user. For this purpose, the server.py
script extracts the IP address and related port number from the re-
ceived query. Then, based on the size of the query vector, two main
sub-vectors are extracted: the aggregated proile vector PQ,aдд
and the encrypted query qe . Afterwards, both UnWrapMessage
and UnPadMessage are executed to return the session key and the
query content, and to remove the padding characters respectively.
After retrieving search results, and receiving results from TPs, the
server.py script starts deining the result vector R. Note that, for
our CoWSA prototype, WSE and TPs' results are simulated and pre-
sented as follows: Here is your search result and Here are your ads,
respectively. Let us note that server.py script encrypts the generated
message, corresponding to the search results, using the extracted
session key sC−WSE retrieved when receiving the request, and the
AES.encrypt algorithm, by enforcing AES module imported from
the Crypt.cipher library. Recall that a lag b is also added to the
created response vector, referring to a backward message. The ob-
tained result constitutes the WSE response and is sent to the IP
address, extracted by the server.py script when receiving the query
vector.
6.3.2 Relaying the Response Vector. The response vector is trans-
mitted to the client, by passing through the diferent path's nodes,
by performing the relay↓rsp algorithm. That is, an involved user
has to keep the active status, i.e., waiting for incoming connections,
to receive the response vector from the predecessor user⁄WSE
server. Thus, once receiving R, the user.py script applies two main
testing operations. The irst test is performed on the irst character
in order to check the lag value. In the sequel, a new session key
is generated. The second test is applied on the IP address of the
previous relaying user. Indeed, if R comes from the WSE server,
the PadMessage function is irst executed to add the padding char-
acters, then theWrapMessage function is used to concatenate the
received message (except the irst character), the public key of the
next relaying user and the new generated session key. Otherwise,
if the message comes from another relaying user, the user.py script
irst performs the UnWrapMessage function, taking as input the
received message (except the irst character) and his private key, in
order to extract the Here are your ads message sent by the server.py
script. Finally, the user.py script concatenates the resulting R with
the b lag, before transmitting to the next user.
6.3.3 Retrieving the Search Results. The client.py script retrieves
the search results associated to his query, by performing the get↓rsp
algorithm. Indeed, to receive the response vector, the client has
to keep the active status, i.e., waiting for incoming connections.
The received response message should include the b lag. Thus, the
client.py script executes the UnWrapMessage function to retrieve
the encrypted search results. Then, using the shared session key
sC−WSE , the message is decrypted, by executing AES.decrypt algo-
rithm. Finally, to retrieve the clear-text, client.py script removes the
padding characters by using the UnPadMessage function. Thus,
the message Here is your search result, originally sent by the WSE
server, is displayed on the client's screen.
6.4 Implementation Discussion
Several tests are conducted, in order to show the feasibility of
CoWSA prototype in real-world settings. The performed tests are
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based on several varieties of the same search query, simulating
the categories that would be introduced by the aggregated proile.
Indeed, the addition of keywords that correspond to categories
already used by the WSE server for indexing, returns, in most cases,
more relevant results. This remains valid for a limited number
of unambiguous categories. However, note that introducing these
categories as keywords is not as eicient as processing them as a
precise user's proile, typically processed with conventional WSEs.
Therefore, it is worth deducing that the integration of CoWSA
prototype provided better personalized results, i.e., more relevant
to the real preferences of the user. The use of this cooperative ap-
proach enhances the customization of the results obtained but does
not compromise users' privacy especially that unlike traditional
solutions, the CoWSA prototype does not rely on a central entity
collecting personal data. In addition, the client's proile is not shared
with the WSE and is locally stored at the client side. Thus, queries
cannot be associated with the identity of the originator of the query.
The privacy preservation is becoming an arising concern for
end-users. However, this protection should not jeopardize the qual-
ity of the service as this will ultimately reduce its usability. For
this reason, the CoWSA prototype seeks to minimize the impact of
using cryptographic blocks on response times. Even though, the
introduction of new resource-consuming mechanisms and crypto-
blocks inevitably increases the communication overheads, results
on the simulated environments showed that response's times are
still acceptable.
7 CONCLUSION
Under the personalization and improvement of users' experience
concerns, the massive collection of personal data by diferent web-
applications, driven by the establishment of precise users' proiles
has raised several privacy challenges.
A novel privacy-preserving cooperative computing framework
for web-search applications, CoWSA, is introduced. It presents
several security features that make it suitable for several web-search
services such as advertisements and news. CoWSA allows clients
to securely submit their queries, while relying on random relaying
users. These entities are encouraged to join a particular query w.r.t.
their relevant interests, and to add their interests to the query's
associated proile, as they receive on the way back a panorama of
personalized ads and news. This mitigates single points of failures,
while ensuring the anonymity of submitting clients.
The security of CoWSA has been discussed and the proposed
framework has been proven to be resistant to several data leakages
and forgery attacks performed either by a curious WSE, a malicious
user and client or a selish user. Finally, a proof of concept is pre-
sented, under the CoWSA test-bed, in order to show the feasibility
of the proposed framework.
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